Power and Logics in Scottish Football: The financial collapse of Rangers
proposed by the club's administrators was rejected by the company's main creditor, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), resulting in the club's principal assets being transferred to a new company (newco) and liquidators appointed. The administration period has focused attention not only on the chaotic financial mismanagement and governance failures at Rangers in recent years, but also on the economic structure, logics and governance of Scottish football.
Theoretical Background and Method
Over the last three decades or so, institutional theory has become one of the dominant approaches to understanding organisations (Greenwood et al., 2008) . A key concept of institutional theory is the organisational field, referring to organisations that in total constitute a recognised area of institutional life. Over time field-level studies have moved from emphasising the importance of conformity to the norms and expectations of the institutional environment, to more contextual-based approaches which examine the actions of actors within a field in light of their institutional circumstances. Central to this are institutional logics; broad cultural beliefs and rules that structure cognition and fundamentally shape decision making F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 and action in a field (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) . Sport, with its distinct structures and stakeholders, provides an excellent empirical setting in which to consider institutional perspectives (Washington and Patterson, 2011) . Some sports such as professional sports leagues in the US are seen as being committed to one institutional logic, namely the commercialisation of team sport as an entertainment industry dedicated to the maximisation of returns (Quirk and Fort, 1999) . Other sport fields like European football are seen to have competing or coexisting institutional logics which also emphasise the importance of sporting reward, of social and community well-being, of connectivity to the amateur game: in short of the specificity of football (sport) (Gammels ter and Senaux, 2011 ). Yet at the same time, the increased prominence of a commercial logic emphasises financial stability and certainty, thus questioning things like the merit-hierarchy structure predicated on promotion and relegation and achievement-based entry to the Europe-wide competitions which are seen as distinctive features of the European model of sports (Gerrard, 2004; Meier, 2008; Szymanski, 2004) . As Gammels ter and Senaux note:
'if there is a core logic of European football, it must be oxymoronic, simultaneously combining but also balancing the incongruous qualities of solidarity and inequality and of cooperation and competition ' (2011, 277) .
Several studies have addressed competing logics in sport fields and of how these can provide the foundation for conflict and change over time, including change in a field's dominant logic. In a study of rugby union in England, O'Brien and Slack (2003) observed that institutional change, the professionalization of the game, was accompanied by a shift in logic; a traditional amateur logic being replaced by a dominant professional logic. In contrast in a study of French football, Senaux (2011) suggested that increased commercialisation led to the emergence of a new logic that supplemented rather than replaced the original prevailing logic. This, it was argued, led to institutional pluralism; a situation in which there is more than one set of rules for the game. Challenges involved in seeking to change the rules of a game were evidenced in a previous study focusing on Scottish football (Morrow, 2013 forthcoming). While that country's two dominant football clubs -actors that were most privileged by domestic institutional arrangements -argued that the consequence of an increasingly explicit financial logic within European football was the need for further institutional change in the structure of the European field, other competing logics continued to be of greater significance, in particular the continuing centrality of national embeddedness and the importance attached to supranational bodies in the specific setting of sport. In mainstream literature, change within organisational fields has also focused on the role of peripheral actors, organisations that are embedded within a field but less privileged by its existing institutional arrangements (Leblebici et al., 1991) ; and of the importance to these actors of seeking to reconcile contradictory institutional arrangements (Seo and Creed, 2002) .
Key to any consideration of logics and behaviour within an organisation field is power. While difficult to define, the consequences of power are easily recognizable: those who possess power are able to bring about the consequences they desire (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977) . Power is not necessarily conceptualised as a static resource belonging to a person or position, but rather can be relational; a function of dependencies that arise between parties within a field (Bondy, 2008) , resulting in power imbalances within that field. This paper makes extensive use of secondary source material to provide the context of the study: the economic and sporting structure of the Scottish football field, the statements issued by key participants in the story; and extensive newspaper and website coverage. The Rangers story has been reported on an almost daily basis across the traditional media, in political and current affairs magazines (see, for example, Knight, 2012; McKenna, 2012; Morrow, 2012) and in new media including independent websites and blogs which have come to prominence during the administration period, most notably Rangerstaxcase.com, awarded the Orwell prize for political writing for best blog.
The on-going nature of the case, in particular continuing legal and other regulatory investigations, mean that it is not possible to supplement this secondary source information with, for example, primary interview material. However, the volume and depth of secondary material available on this seismic event in Scottish football provided a fascinating opportunity to use the Rangers story to illuminate the structure, governance, power imbalances and logics in the Scottish football field. The paper begins by providing an overview of the complex circumstances surrounding the administration and liquidation of Rangers. This is followed by a section on the context of Scottish football. The paper continues with an analysis of power in Scottish football and of the logics at play therein, highlighting in particular the role that commercialism has played in creating the present crises. The paper concludes by The company had previously acted as an advisor to Whyte in connection with his takeover of the club; a relationship that was alleged to amount to a conflict of interest (Daly, 2012) . Whyte had purchased Rangers in May 2011 from Sir David Murray for the sum of £1, along with an agreement that the club's debt of £18m to the Lloyds Banking Group, as well as securities the bank held over the club's principal tangible assets, would be assigned to Whyte's companies and then repaid. Although Whyte provided proof of funds to the satisfaction of Murray (SFA Judicial Panel, 2012, para. 30) , it transpired that funds used to clear the club's bank debt were in fact provided by a football finance agency, Ticketus (Herald, 2012a) . Since 1999 it had provided advance working capital to Rangers on an annual basis, being compensated from the proceeds of subsequent season ticket sales. In this case it provided £24.4m which it believed gave it the right to a significant number of season tickets at Ibrox for the next three seasons (Duff & Phelps, 2012a) .
Duff & Phelps, questioned the validity of Ticketus' claim in the Court of Session, the end result of which was that sum being included in the list of creditors, and subsequently the CVA, prepared by the administrators. Ticketus indicated that it would pursue Whyte and companies he controlled in respect of guarantees provided to it (BBC Sport, 2012f), while the Crown office asked Strathclyde Police to start a criminal investigation into Whyte's takeover and the club's subsequent financial management (BBC, 2012c) . The list of creditors was prepared on the basis of the club's maximum possible liability and thus in addition to the obligations to HMRC (£9m) and Ticketus, included sums potentially due in respect of tax cases which arose during Murray's ownership of Rangers -an agreed settlement figure of £4m in respect of a so-called 'small tax case' (arising from a discounted options tax scheme for payments made to two overseas players) and a provision of £75m in respect of what came to be known as 'the big tax case' (Duff & Phelps, 2012a ). This case centred on an Employee Benefits Trust (EBT) set up by the then Rangers' parent company, the Murray Group, as a vehicle to reward senior administrative staff and some top players. No PAYE or National Insurance was paid by the club or by the recipient in respect of loans paid from the Trust and its use was successfully challenged by HMRC. The club appealed and the case was referred to a First Tier Tribunal hearing. One benefit of the EBT was that is made the club markedly more attractive to higher quality players. Related to the use of EBTs the SPL initiated an independent investigation into whether Rangers had used dual contracts in conflict with the rules of the SPL, which require all payments to players to be made in accordance with a single contact of employment (SPL, 2012a, D9.3) . The First Tier Tribunal, which met initially in October 2010, finally released its decision two years later on 29 th October 2012; the delay in part at least arising because the Tribunal of three individuals was unable to reach a unanimous view, with a dissenting view being provided by the Chartered Accountant member of the Tribunal. The majority verdict allowed the appeal in principle, accepting the argument that the sums received by most recipients were loans rather than absolute entitlements, and hence HMRC's assessment should be reduced substantially with only some payments subject to taxation (First Tier Tax Tribunal Tax Chamber, 2012) . Following this decision, an e-petition was launched requesting HM Treasury to examine the conduct of HMRC in terms of the investigation into During the administration period the SFA set up an independent inquiry into Rangers' business dealings. It found that Whyte was not a fit and proper person to own a football club, resulting in the SFA charging Whyte and Rangers with seven breaches of its rules (Regan, 2012) . A Judicial Panel, appointed to hear the case against Rangers, imposed a fine of £160,000 and a 12 month embargo on the club registering new players over the age of 18 (Murray, 2012) ; a sanction which resulted in an outcry from the Rangers manager and many of its supporters (BBC Sport, 2012h; STV, 2012b ). An appeal was launched by the club's administrators who argued that the club should not be held responsible for Whyte's actions, but this was rejected (Appellate Tribunal, 2012) . The administrators indicated that they did not believe the transfer embargo to be competent and outside the powers of the tribunal When Rangers was put into administration it was deducted 10 points by the SPL (SPL, 2012a, Rule A6.8). During that period it became apparent that it was a matter for the board of the SPL as to whether a newco Rangers, i.e. a new company acquiring the assets of the old company in contrast to Rangers emerging out of administration on completion of a CVA, could be permitted immediate entry back into the SPL (McConville, 2012) . Public reaction to this information coupled with its own concerns about the fitness of its rules, saw the SPL bring forward financial fair play proposals for consideration, including a 75% reduction in SPL pooled media and commercial payments for a period of three seasons to any club re-launched as a newco (BBC Sport, 2102d). Having initially deferred any decision to allow clarity to emerge over the situation of Rangers (McLaughlin, 2012) , the SPL members finally decided at a meeting on 3oth May 2012 that they would not in fact decide what to do in the event of a newco applying for entry to the SPL; agreeing instead that any such application would be considered on its merits by all SPL members collectively should it arise, along with any sanctions it wished to impose (Grant, 2012) .
After a number of false starts, on the 29 th May 2012 the administrators presented a CVA to creditors, based upon their acceptance of an £8.5m bid in the form of a loan to be repaid along with interest by 2020, from a consortium headed by Charles Green (BBC Sport, 2012e; Duff & Phelps, 2012b) . In addition, a binding agreement was put The consequences of this decision were highly significant for Rangers. The first priority for Green was to make an application for Rangers newco to be granted permission to retain its membership of the SPL and to enter into discussions on the terms of any such deal. Even if it had been granted continued SPL status, as a minimum newco Rangers would not have been permitted to participate in European football for three seasons. In addition the club had to initiate discussions with the SFA about whether newco Rangers could retain its SFA registration, against a backdrop of the Appellate Tribunal still considering the appropriate sanction to be imposed on the club. The implications were no less serious for the other clubs as will be set out in the following sections.
The Context of Scottish Football
The SFA is the governing body of the sport in Scotland, overseeing all aspects of the game including its professional leagues, the SPL (12 clubs) and the Scottish Football League (SFL) (three divisions of 10). Its governance and structures were radically (McLeish, 2010) . The SFA now has a main Board consisting of seven members, including an independent non-executive director, which focuses on corporate strategy and top-line decision-making. The main Board is supplemented by two operational boards, one focusing on the professional game, the other the nonprofessional game (SFA, 2012b).
The SPL was formed in 1998, a break-away league from the SFL. Its objectives include to:
• Build a league competition with standing and recognition throughout Europe;
• Represent and safeguard the interests of its members;
• Maximise the commercial value of SPL football by fully exploiting commercial rights and properties (SPL, 2012b) .
Scottish football has a long history of domination by Celtic and Rangers. The two clubs have often been referred to as 'The Old Firm', a phrase first used in 1904, in recognition of the commercial and financial benefits arising out of their rivalry and their dominance of the Scottish game (Murray, 1988) . On only 18 occasions has a club other than Celtic or Rangers been crowned champions of the top division, the last time being 1984/85. In the fourteen years since its inception, the SPL has been won seven times each by Celtic and Rangers, with the other club being second in all but one season. Until now neither Celtic nor Rangers had ever played other than in the top division of Scottish football.
These two clubs have also dominated financially (see Figure 1) , generating approximately 70% of SPL turnover. Peaks and troughs in the turnover of Celtic and Rangers are largely explained by participation in the UEFA Champions' League.
Attendance have been concentrated in these two clubs (see Figure 2) , with between 55 and 60% of all SPL spectators attending either Celtic or Rangers home matches.
One consequence of this footballing and financial supremacy was that it provoked widespread discussion, emanating from both the clubs directly and the Scottish media, about the need for and prospects of structural change within British and European football as a way of dealing with the perceived structural weakness of Scottish football (Morrow, 2013 forthcoming) .
[ altering the voting structure were deferred, as clubs struggled to come to terms with the complexity of the situation facing them and its consequences. However, at its simplest, this case highlights that in some, albeit extreme situations, it is not possible for different logics to co-exist within a field and that conflict can only be resolved if one logic constrains another. Any decision taken by SPL member clubs to punish but not prohibit the newco option would be solely a financial decision; far removed from the notions of the specificity of sport articulated by the European Union. At the same time, the SPL is also a case study of flawed governance and conflicts of interest: the league members are its clubs; its board is made up of representatives of its 
Reclaiming the Game -Power on the Periphery?
At a special meeting of the SPL held on July 4 th 2012 the SPL clubs voted by a majority of 10-1 -bizarrely the vote in favour coming from Rangers itself, the abstention from Kilmarnock FC -to reject the application from Rangers newco for a place in the SPL (Herald, 2012c) . By the time of the meeting, the decision was a foregone conclusion as a sufficient number of clubs had already made public the fact they would vote against the newco. It is clear that a number of factors contributed to the SPL clubs' decision, including strongly-held views of some club directors and chairmen on: the need for fairness and integrity; the need for Rangers' behaviour to be punished; and the perceived lack of contrition by some individuals connected with Rangers. One factor, however, was central to their decision, namely pressure and expectations brought to bear on clubs by their supporters.
While there is widespread acceptance of football club businesses as stakeholder organisations, with supporters identified as key stakeholders therein (see, for example, Brown et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2008; Hamil, 1999; Hamil and Morrow, 2011; Morrow, 2003; Senaux, 2008) to take steps to alter the institutional arrangements and logics prevailing in the field.
In any field, power is not fixed and neither is the nature of the relationships therein.
In this situation, the involvement of supporters and, in effect their building of a coalition of interest within the field, strengthened relationships between sources of dependence, and acted as a way of challenging long-standing, powerful interests (Benson, 1975; Morrow and Idle, 2008; Podolny and Page, 1988) . The threat of market-based discipline, coupled with social control arising from widespread dissatisfaction about the perceived failure of a putative Scottish institution to fulfil its basic social and corporate obligations and the implications of its behaviour in terms of sporting fair play, have resulted in a situation where institutional change became both necessary and possible.
Like other governing bodies, the SFA had acquiesced previously to the (financial) demands of the major clubs, in accepting and authorising the setting up of the SPL.
Its role in the Rangers situation has been paradoxical. From one perspective it has looked like an impotent bystander, in particular over its unwillingness and/or inability to intervene during the takeover of Rangers by Craig Whyte, citing its lack of resource (Forsyth, 2012b) . But from another perspective arguably the case has allowed it to begin to re-impose itself as the body at the summit of the Scottish football governance pyramid, showing a renewed willingness to lead and to govern. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 onwards (Fisher, 2012) . At the same time newco Rangers would be required to accept responsibility for football debts and fines incurred under the previous regime.
However, many SFL clubs were extremely unhappy at the situation they were placed in by the SPL and its clubs and by the arguments and language used by of SFA Chief Executives, Stewart Regan, and SPL Chief Executive, Neil Doncaster (see, for example, Herald 2012b), and this proposal was comprehensively rejected by a majority of 25-5 at a meeting of SFL clubs in Glasgow on 13 July 2012 (Jordan, 2012 . As a result newco Rangers was invited to participate in SFL Division 3 in season 2012/13. At this juncture the precise implications of explicitly prioritising sporting logic over commercial logic and on the sustainability of Scottish football of course remain to be seen. However, early evidence suggests that the financial situation is not as challenging for SPL clubs as had been feared, largely due to the decision of its broadcast partners to continue supporting the league, as well as the rights to show five SFL Division 3 games involving Rangers. In terms of attendance, of the ten SPL clubs who also played in the SPL last season at the mid-point of season 2012/13 five clubs report an increased average attendance and five a decreased average attendance compared to the average for the complete 2011/12 season; equivalent to an overall drop among these clubs of close to 4% (www.scotprem.co.uk). But at the same time the increased attendances enjoyed by Looking ahead it is essential that the crisis and the response of clubs, supporters and the wider public thereto act as a catalyst for managed change in the structure and organisation of Scottish football. Taken together with the vitally important role played by supporters in having their voices heard, the hope is that in future fewer actors in Scottish football will be found on the periphery and that greater cognisance is taken of the distribution of power and the importance of logics in the football field. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
